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Comparing Chinese and European
Discourses regarding to the “Belt
and Road Initiative”
Une comparaison des discours chinois et européen sur « Initiative Route et
Ceinture »
Olivier Arifon, Zhao Alexandre Huang, Zheng Yue and Anna Zyw Melo
1 Since the arriving of Xi Jinping to the decision-making level of the Chinese Communist
Party (CPC) in 2012, Beijing formulated the reinvention and reorganization plan of the
former Silk Road in 2013 and integrated the investment-oriented going out strategy to
promote the Chinese version of the economy and industrial globalization. This plan was
first initialed as “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) (一带一路, yi dai yi lu), and then relabeled as
“Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) (一带一路倡议, yi dai yi lu chang yi) in 2017. The project
claims to be an all-around cooperative relationship between China and 68 countries along
the so-called new Silk Road, from China to Europe, by road, and by sea.
 
From the BRICS to the Belt and Road initiative (BRI),
China’s hybrid competitive regionalism
2 The  official  and  unofficial  utterances  on  the  topic  of  BRI  between  the  Chinese  and
European  media  are  the  focus  of  this  paper,  by  using  two  different  frameworks  to
examine  Sino-European  discussions  on  the  BRI.  This  essay  is  not  to  discuss  China’s
diplomacy and soft power.  It  intends to focus on how Beijing promotes its ambitious
globalization program to the international community and the European media’s attitude
toward the BRI. It allows to understand China-EU’s different perceptions and opinions on
the BRI. Through the content analysis of media framing, this study also examines the
effectiveness of China’s global communication strategy in promoting the BRI. 
3 We propose to mobilize the organization of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa), older than the BRI project (2009 versus 2014), as a framework. The BRICS is
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a  cooperative  project  intending to  change  the  international  order.  It  is  a  symbolic
construction established under the political pressure of its most active members, namely
China, Russia and India. The project represents geopolitical ambitions of these emerging
countries to promote an alternative regime of the Western world (Arifon & Dwyer, 2017;
Gallarotti, 2016; Liu, 2017). 
4 China  also  shows  its  attempt  to  promote  an  alternative  political  project  during  the
uncertain era after the 2008 economic crises through the BRI. Therefore, both BRICS and
BRI could be considered as a counterweight for the future of  the world.  Raising this
question is  increasing the cultural  and political  diversity of  globalization (Ferdinand,
2016; Shi, 2018). 
 
The BRI in Chinese eyes: which content for which
object?
5 In a communication perspective, the BRI could be analyzed as a top-down process which
is similar to the BRICS. By borrowing this perspective, Chinese officials consider the BRI
as a neo-approach of China’s globalization. For instance, Chinese official arguments frame
the BRI as another version of globalization, which represents the shared future and happy
life (Huang & Wang, 2019). Similar cases are also emphasized in China’s BRICS-themed
discourses (Dwyer, 2017; Thussu, 2017). Here is a map describing the general scheme of
the BRI project.
 
Figure 1. China’s new silk roads. Transport infrastructure
6 According to Wang Yiwei (2017, p. 25), “the Belt and Road Initiative makes China stands
in the international moral high ground as it focuses on three missions, namely, common
modernization of countries along the routes, common revival of civilizations as well as
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inclusive globalization, and aims to forge the community of common future integrating
civilization, international and civil order”. However, international scholars point out that
the Chinese government practices strict public opinion censorship and guidance on their
media  and  scholars’  opinions  to  positively  promote  China’s  image  in  the  external
propaganda  activities  (Arsène,  2011;  Huang  & Wang,  2019;  Li,  2015).  Therefore,  it  is
necessary to rationalize and explain the BRI in a seductive aspect by analyzing China’s
discourses or narratives. 
 
Two theoretical frameworks and two methodologies
A comparative approach
7 Based on the previous finding on the BRICS (Arifon & Dwyer, 2017), the BRI could be seen
as an object with commercial and industrial purposes for improving trade but also for its
communicative and symbolic dimensions (Castells,  2008).  By comparing European and
Chinese perspectives on the BRI, we plan to elaborate images and representations from
both sides. Research in a comparative approach reveals differences and similarities. From
the standpoint of multilateralism (Keohane, 1984; Telo & Keohane, 2013), scholars argue
that the European Union approach—and its extension to Europe—represents a laboratory
exploring  how  multi-level  cooperation  and  transnationalism  can  go  beyond  the
Westphalia  sovereignty,  to  deepen  cooperation.  Frankopan  (2015)  develops  a  vision,
including arguments and stories from the West and the East and presenting how Central
Asia was and will become the center of the world. Besides, Brook (2010) reads Western
and Asian sources on the eve of the globalization during the 17th century and details the
stories from both sides and the perceptions linked to them. 
 
A communication perspective: discourse analysis
8 In a communication approach, this article intends to mobilize “framing” and “narrative”
to develop the discourse analysis. Framing involves “a few aspects of a perceived reality
and connecting them in a narrative that promotes a particular interpretation” (Entman,
2010,  p. 391).  It  can perform four functions:  “define problems,  specify causes,  convey
moral assessments, and endorse remedies” (ibid, p. 391).
9 Entman emphasizes the framing bias and points out the two most relevant elements. For
him, content bias identifies “consistently slanted framing of mediated communication to
promote the success  of  specific  interest,  party or  ideology in competition to control
governmental power” (Entman, 2010, p. 393). To be more precise, a bias can be noticed
only when slant holds over time, revealing an intentional mechanism or structure by the
media. 
10 The second dimension of bias concerns decision-making process. As Entman argues, “the
media’s  decision-making  biases  guide  routine  information  processing  by  individual
journalists  and,  manifested  as  tactic  norms  and  routines,  by  news  organizations”
(Entman, 2010, p. 394).
11 According  to  Bläser  (2005,  p. 289),  “information  and  specialized  knowledge  are  both
indispensable for the construction and exertion of framing power”. If we reveal framing
strategies in politics, one should consider a diachronic process, such as the end of an
electoral  campaign,  or  after  the end of  a  mandate.  In other words,  the long-term is
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necessary to point out such a process. Besides, to complete the framework on framing,
political  power should be analyzed.  For instance,  by comparing several  transnational
televisions and networks, Koch and Mattelart (2016) indicate the importance of framing
and culture in the communication process.
12 Discourse analysis, as a qualitative research method, is frequently utilized to find the
latent  meaning  of  texts.  The  critical  discourse  analysis  of  Fairclough and the  frame
analysis of Van Dijk are the two main approaches in discourse analysis. Van Dijk (1999)
states that “structures of news discourse have particular social, political, or ideological
implications. Not only can the text be analyzed but also the ‘relations between structures
of text and talk’ and ’of their cognitive, social, cultural, or historical “contexts”.” The
literature on representation studies focuses on the use of the theoretical approach. For
instance (Goldberger 2004) uses frame analysis from a social constructivist standpoint to
analyze how United States news magazines represented immigrants in the aftermath of
the September 11th terrorist attacks. 
13 Additional  framework on the narrative  is  also  relevant.  Miskimmon,  O’Loughlin,  and
Roselle define a narrative as “frameworks that allow humans to connect unconnected
phenomena  around  some  causal  transformation”  (quoted  in  Schmitt,  2018,  p. 490).
Political actors produce a narrative, composed of actors, events, plot time, setting and
place, to give coherence to an action or a policy. In his essay, Schmitt considers different
types of narratives by distinguishing system narratives,  identity narratives,  and issue
narratives.  He suggests,  “to relate the study of strategic narratives with the study of
political myths” (Schmitt, 2018, p. 492). Even if such a connection remains sensitive, a
narrative should be understood in terms of content, i.e., how the structure of the story
overlaps existing ones, common background of shared cultural references of a society? At
least in Western Europe, considering the literature and the research on orientalism for
centuries, we argue that the resonance between the myth and the narrative could be
sufficient. Regarding this statement, the evidence appears: the narrative that China tells
Europe and to the world fulfills the mentioned elements as discussed later.
 
Press analysis method
14 The research period runs from January 1, 2016, to February 28, 2018, which ensures to
collect a significant amount of news articles. This long-term observation also covers the
first session of BRI’s summit in China in May 2017. We provide a discourse analysis based
on four leading European newspapers: Le Monde (France), The Guardian (United Kingdom),
Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Germany), and El País (Spain). These newspapers are seen as “media
of reference” in their countries, and they are members of the International Consortium of
investigative journalists (ICIJ)1. By using “Factiva” and “Europresse”, we have collected
news coverage with keywords in English, French, German, Spanish and Chinese: “Belt and
Road initiative”, “one belt, one road”, “silk road”, “21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”,
“OBOR”, “BRI”, “Seidenstrasse”, “Neue Seidenstrasse”, “El cinturón y la ruta”, and “Iniciativa
del  cinturón y ruta de la  seda”.  We collect a total  of  450 articles in the western press.
74 were not relevant such as the articles mentioning “Silk Road”, the dark net website
proposing illegal  drugs and arms,  or the ones related to the “Silk road ensemble”,  a
classical music group.
15 On the Chinese’s side, we collect news from three newspapers. First, the People’s Daily is
China’s  largest  newspaper  and the  most  authoritative  one.  Second,  the  news agency
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Xinhua is the dominant channel related to the Communist Party and the Chinese central
government. Third, the Global Times is an English-language newspaper under the People’s
Daily and is the primary English newspaper in China. 
16 We have conducted several semi-structured interviews with former and current officers
of the EU institutions and with a member of the Chinese’s mission to the EU in Brussels.
These interviews will be used to complete the data collection from the media scope and to
confirm or not, media opinions of both the EU and China on the BRI.
 
Twitter discourse analysis method
17 To  complete  our  analysis,  we  examine  some  discourses  on  the  BRI  on  Twitter.  The
rapidity, efficacity, and real-time communication model of social media become a crucial
aspect for computer-mediated communications at the digital age (Correa, Hinsley, & De
Zuniga, 2010; Powell, 2009). Social media allow different users to build their own network
environment with low operating costs. The users can share text, pictures and photos,
videos and links to other applications and groups of users (Lin & Lu, 2011, p. 1152). It
provides, on the other hand, a platform for the effective delivery of information. By using
functions  such  as  retweet,  comment  or  mention,  information  can  be  continuously
forwarded and spread on Twitter.
18 Due  to  the  severe  Internet  and  social  media  censorship  in  China,  international
mainstream social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook are strictly blocked in
the Chinese mainland (Arsène, 2016). Meantime, due to the registration rules of China’s
social media accounts2 and the language barrier, China’s domestic Weibo (Chinese version
of Twitter) is challenging to serve the government’s international communication needs.
Therefore, Twitter has begun to be widely used in the process of international political
communication of Beijing’s official institutions (Huang & Arifon, 2018). Previous research
confirms that China is mobilizing Twitter as an essential channel in its public diplomacy
to positively promote China to the world in a fast and flexible manner (Chen, 2015). 
19 Regarding the above reasons, it is vital to analyze the Twitter discourses on the subject as
a supplement to traditional media discourses analysis. This supplementary study permits
to  understand  how  Beijing  discusses  the  BRI-related  issues  on  Twitter  and  China’s
attitudes and methods.
20 In practice, this study not only provides a content analysis of Chinese diplomatic Twitter
accounts,  it  also  pays  attention to  the news stories  released by Chinese state-owned
media on Twitter. We choose four Twitter accounts, including two Chinese diplomatic
missions to international organizations based in Europe (i.e., China’s Mission to Geneva
for  the  United  Nations  Office  at  Geneva  [@ChinaMissionGva],  China’s  Mission  to  the
European Union [@ChinaEUMission]) and two Chinese state-owned media (i.e., Xinhua [
@XHNews) and China Global Television Network [@CGTNOfficial]) to collect BRI-themed
tweets. 
21 This study mainly adopts a quantitative approach. We use the Twitter monitor platform
TwitterDeck and the Twitter API to collect tweets. We also mobilized the test mining tool
ConText for data analysis (Diesner et al., 2015). The ConText is developed by the University
of Illinois to explore text corpus from natural language text data,  it  also provides to
analyze text data and network data. Furthermore, this programming allows to achieve
the “sentiment analysis” (Kharde & Sonawane, 2016; Ray & Chakrabarti, 2017) of the text
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data and to discover the subjective attitude of information publishers on specific topics.
In fact, as an application of natural language processing, computational linguistics, and
text analytics, the sentiment analysis identifies and extracts subjective attitudes of words
from the source materials. “It is the computational study of people’s opinions, appraisals,
attitudes,  and  emotions  toward  entities,  individuals,  issues,  events,  topics  and  their
attributes” (Tripathi, Vishwakarma, & Lala, 2015, p. 668). This algorithmic method helps
us to distinguish the tone of a semantic statement, generally positive, negative or neutral.
This analysis permits to understand the overall attitude and high-frequency words used
by the Chinese official Twitter accounts on the topic of the BRI. It also affords insights on
the importance of Chinese officials’ focus on this topic.
 
Comparing Chinese and European opinions on BRI 
22 In order to look at the BRI with Chinese’s eyes, we have gathered arguments of two
Chinese’s  civil  servants,  reflecting  the  way  China  presents  the  concept,  and  the
characteristics of the concept. Shi Wei, a former responsible for the BRI at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs  of  People’s  Republic  of  China,  puts  the focus  of  China’s  globalization
efforts on one term: “connectivity, by road, sea, and by telecommunication”. It is divided
into two parts: “hard connectivity, which includes infrastructure and transports, and soft
connectivity, which involves rules, standards and customs”3.
23 Wang identifies fears and threats related to the BRI/OBOR (2017, p. 158). He explores the
problems of misperceptions related to the BRI to be compared with the results of our
corpus.
• “The initiative is a westward strategy,” arguing that China wants to move to the West.
• “The Belt and Road initiative belongs to China,” and not to the other participating countries.
• “The initiative pays more attention to the “Belt” than to the “Road”, mentioning that the
focus is on sea solutions implementation, rather than road ones.
• “The initiative is an attempt to bring back the ancient order in the name of civilization
revival.” Wang refers to the ancient system of tribute from vassal countries to the Chinese’s
empire. “Economic dependence” is the current version.
• “The initiative is an effort to export excess capacity,” seeing the BRI as a Chinese version of
the Marshall plan, trying to improve its exports.
• “The  initiative  is  a  Chinese  version  of  economic  imperialism,  or  globalization 4.0,  the
Chinese version of globalization.”
• “The  initiative  is  a  resurrection  of  China-Centrism” where  it  is  said  that  the  BRI  is  an
attempt to promote Chinese standards.
• “The initiative is all about China’s neighborhood diplomacy.” 
• “The initiative is a closed loop,” which shows the topic is difficult to be understood.
• “The initiative seeks military expansion in the disguise of economic cooperation.” Wang
argues that the initiative should not repeat the old path of Western expansion.
24 Chinese officials and official scholars display in an implicate manner the legality of the
Belt and Road Initiative. For them, China uses this project to stand together with other
countries  for  defending  globalization  and  multilateralism,  promoting  China-World
Alliance and win-win cooperation, and demonstrating the image of China’s friendship.
However, what is the Belt and Road in the eyes of the media ? In other words, how do the
media in the EU and China frame the Belt and Road Initiative?
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The BRI according to the European press
25 During the period of the research, European media have gradually focused on the BRI
issue in specific periods:  during the first  BRI’s  summit in China in May 2017,  during
foreign officials’  visits  in China (Theresa May,  Emmanuel  Macron in 2018)  as  well  as
essential Chinese events (the Communist Party Congress in October 2018). 
26 Among the 376 articles, we elaborate on six categories of European news stories:
 
Geopolitical concerns
27 A large number of the EU’s news stories show the concern on the BRI’s consequences. In
general, European media worry about China’s geopolitical and economic domination in
Asia and the potential of “China’s Threat” to the EU:
“BRI would shift the geopolitical center of gravity from the Atlantic to central Asia,
placing Iran, India and Turkey at its core” (Wintour, 27/06/2017, The Guardian).
“US doesn’t lead the world anymore” (Leach, 28/09/2017, The Guardian).
“China is mounting the first global challenge to the US since the collapse of the
Soviet Union” (Elliott, 27/10/2017, The Guardian).
“Does spring 2017 inaugurate ‘China’s century’?” (Frachon, 09/06/2017, Le Monde).
“Behind  the  initiative  is  a  geostrategic  interest  that  materializes  President  Xi’s
favorite motto: ‘The Chinese Dream’. The challenge is to impose the footprint of
Beijing around the world” (Quesada, 27/11/2017, El País).
 
Strategic concerns
28 The EU countries’ leading news explain their fear of China’s strategic presence in several
territories, notably the Chinese investments in the Balkans (i.e., from the port of Athens
to the railways in ex-Yugoslavia), but also in Africa and Central Asia:
“The port of Piraeus is the ‘dragonhead’ of this strategy as far as the seaway is
concerned” (Guillot, 14/08/2017, Le Monde).
“China’s activism should alert Europeans on the risk of geo-economic encirclement
weighing on the EU” (El Ferdaous, 06/11/2016, Le Monde).
“The growing presence of China in Africa is a threat to French influence” (Le Belzic,
08/01/2018, Le Monde).
“China feels that its political and cultural influence needs to grow proportionately,
starting with its periphery in south-east and central Asia. […] Though the initial
focus of the Belt and Road is naturally on China’s immediate periphery, Europe lies
as its final goal and main justification” (Maçães, 31/01/2018, The Guardian).
 
Economic concerns
29 The EU media critic China’s rising influence in the world economic order and express
their  worries  by highlighting the potential  of  China’s  economic power menacing the
economy and industries in the EU-friendly countries:
“These investments are part of  a larger strategy to enter the European market,
since 11 of these States are members of the EU. China intends to use them as a base
to expand to other activities in the continent” (Sahuquillo, 27/11/2018, El País).
“Critics  have  said  the  project  is  designed  to  pull  other  countries  in  the  region
deeper into China’s sphere of influence, and that it could give unfair preferential
treatment to Chinese contractors” (Phillips, 27/11/2018, The Guardian).
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Political issues
30 A part of the EU news on the BRI issue mentions the wariness on China’s political designs,
objectives, and impacts; a large number of new European stories imply that Beijing seeks
to export its political values, norms, and model:
“It is part of a push to cement China’s position as the undisputed power of Asia”
(Phillips, 27/11/2018, The Guardian).
“Infrastructure project which has political designs to bring neighboring countries
closer into Beijing’s orbit” (Phillips, 30/01/2018 a, The Guardian).
“Some suspect  [BRI]  is  a  ploy  to  extend Beijing’s  global  political  and  economic
reach” (Phillips, 30/01/2018 b, The Guardian).
“BRI is a fundamental change in the way that strategic business is done” (Karp,
23/01/2018, The Guardian).
“Xi signaled China’s willingness to reshape the entire world around its own needs”  
(Mason, 22/08/2018, The Guardian).
 
European dimension
31 China’s  BRI  project  has  the  potential  to  touch  the  European’s  interests  in  several
industries. Through the observation of news collected in the corpus, several verbatim
show the doubt and mistrust of European elites on the project “China 16 + 1 4”, because
this project seeks to diverge Western European countries’ interests by exporting Chinese
infrastructure to Central Europe with a low price:
“Beijing’s goal is essentially geopolitical: to strengthen its influence in this region
between Asia and Europe” (Kauffmann, 30/11/2017, Le Monde).
“Chinese interests in Serbia inevitably intersects with those of the European Union.
[…]  It  is  clear  that  in  the  region,  where  there  were  two  actors  that  seemed
preponderant, Europe and Russia, there is now a third party, China” (Sahuquillo,
27/11/2017, El País).
“The East and the Balkans have been a priority for China for years. […] The former
commercial  corridor  […]  has  Eastern  Europe  as  one  of  its  key  communications
links” (Phillips, 12/05/2017, The Guardian).
 
Questioning the project itself
32 A series of  European media articles are questioning China’s vague statements on BRI
projects and mention that China’s specific purposes, detailed plans, and operating rules of
BRI are still unclear:
“Member states wary of Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road initiative without guarantees on
transparency,  sustainability  and  tendering  process”  (Phillips,  16/05/2017,  The
Guardian).
“ ‘Global standards and cyber security’ a concern.” […] “’It is generally about
adhering  to  international  standards,  making  sure  there  is  transparency  in  the
supply chain,  […] ensuring the tendering process is  fair and equitable” (Elgot &
Phillips, 31/01/2018a, The Guardian).
 
Doubt over the capacity of China to obtain all of its projects
“Experts say that nearly four years after the initiative began most projects remain on the
drawing board” (Phillips, 12/05/2017, The Guardian).
 
Comparing Chinese and European Discourses regarding to the “Belt and Road Ini...
Revue française des sciences de l’information et de la communication, 17 | 2019
8
Suspicion on China’s official discourse on BRI: despite China’s effort to present BRI as a
peaceful and win-win project, the European press sees it as political rhetoric.
“Childish imagery being used to promote the project was ‘China’s way of saying that people
shouldn’t  be  afraid  of  its  rising  economic  and  diplomatic  and  political  influence  in  the
region’” (Phillips, 12/05/2017, The Guardian).
“Beware,  say  the  officials:  the  ‘new silk  roads’  are  certainly  a  Chinese  economic
expansionism  that  doesn’t  hide  itself,  but  they  are  not  American-style  political
expansionism!” (Frachon, 24/11/2017, Le Monde).
33 A few articles are neutral, mainly describing the initiative and its potential impacts. Even
fewer materials have a positive stance towards the Belt and Road Initiative, arguing it
would  have  a  beneficial  economic  impact,  namely  on  emerging  Asian  and  African
countries, but also for European companies that could invest on infrastructure building.
It must be noted that the authors of these “sympathetic” articles are in great majority
business people or consultants in the public or private sector.
34 Most  of  the  results,  though  expressing  awe  at  the  BRI’s  size  and  ambition  (Leach,
28/09/2017, The Guardian), display worry and unease about the project. Articles use terms
such as “wary”, “concern”, “suspicion”, revealing a long-installed fear of the initiative,
partly due to its inaccuracy and unpredictability, and partly to China’s new global stance.
Keywords such as “strategic”, “influence”, “power” and “shift” also indicate a general
sense of concern at the BRI’s global impact on multiple levels. President Xi Jinping aims to
shift the world’s geopolitical center of gravity towards China also generates concern, as
shown by the following excerpt: “Xi offered an imposing but extremely authoritarian vision of
the world” (Kettle, 20/10/2017, The Guardian).
 
The BRI according to the Chinese press
35 Since the Belt and Road Initiative is initiated by China’s government, the official Chinese
media used a large amount of resources to report and promote the project (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Number of news on “Belt and Road Initiative” in Chinese media
News organizations 2016-2017 2017-2018
People’s Daily (Overseas Edition) 110 91
Global Times (English Edition) 249 690
Xinhua News 12,575 18,767
Total of news articles 12,934 19,548
36 According to the figures 1 and 2,  the most significant part is  “others” which include
general topics such as “China is facing challenges with an open mind”, “Interconnection
creates more opportunities for the world” and “China and neighboring countries can
have a win-win situation with China’s sincerity”. 
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37 The second largest is about trade and economy, which include international trade and
investment and cover topics like “bilateral investment has stepped into a new stage”. 
38 Culture is the third largest as it’s linked with topics of Chinese language learning, movie,
education and media reports, etc. 
39 International relations have not been paid much attention compared with others. 
40 Technology,  agriculture,  travel and military are the least.  According to the keywords
graph,  the  most  mentioned  words  are  “world”,  “cooperation”,  “Hongkong”,
“construction” “and “win-win”.
 
Figure 1. Categories of news on People’s Daily
Source: www.people.com.cn/
 
Figure 2. Keywords data
Source: www.people.com.cn/
41 On the BRI issue, The Global Times (see Figure 3) uses the keywords “cooperation” and
“belt and road initiative” commonly to emphasize equality and mutual benefits. The ties
between European and Asian countries are mostly mentioned shaping China’s image as
defending globalization and global free trade, that is why the terms like “shared benefit”
and “boost global trade” are also among the key phrases in the news stories. 
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Figure 3. Keywords quoted by Global Times
Source: www.globaltimes.cn
 
Figure 4. Categories of news on Gt
Source: www.globaltimes.cn
42 According  to  the  figure 4,  the  news  is  mostly  about  general  topics  like  “Belt  Road,
milestones for China”, “China’s Belt and Road initiative to be further fleshed out in 2017”,
etc.  The second-largest part is international relations like “Time for Europe to better
position Belt & Road”, “Lebanon keen on the rosy prospect of Belt and Road initiative”.
Trade and finance are also often mentioned. 
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Figure 5. Keywords used by Xinhua
Source : www.xinhua.net
43 As China’s news agency, Xinhua is representative of China’s official voice. Therefore, the
news reported and edited by Xinhua cover more topics than others and focus more on
geopolitics (see Figure 5). The countries included are not only the USA and the European
Union, but also small countries like Lebanon, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and other countries
which play essential roles on the route of the ancient silk road. Taking Kazakhstan as an
example, it is on the way westward of the silk road and is the main route between China
and the rest of Eurasia. Moreover, as it passes through a Muslim territory that has posed
challenges to China, it is significant in China’s geopolitics. 
 
Major findings of the discourses
44 Transitivity,  modality,  and  marked  themes  are  analyzed  to  describe  the  “formal
properties  of  the  text”  (Fairclough,  1995,  p. 26).  Transitivity  is  regarded as  a  crucial
analytical tool that “provides us with the potential for categorizing the infinite variety of
occurrences of ‘goings-on’ into a finite set of process types” (Teo, 2000, p. 25).
45 China intends to promote the BRI in a spirit of openness, inclusiveness and equality. It
seeks  to  avoid  confrontations  with  other  countries  by  using  words  like  “world”,
“cooperation” and “win-win”. The uncertain terms or ideology-loaded references are not
found. The processes of transitivity are also illustrative of the opposing attitudes and
ideologies. China’s discourse seems to be focusing on showing the world as an integrated
whole, in which all countries co-exist, cooperate and prosper together. However, words
and topics are about general issues, calling for agreement and support, which are not
persuasive enough.
46 Wording  such  as  “making  significant  progress”,  “brilliant  plan”  are  standard  in  the
reports. What is progress? How brilliant is it? Does it bring any negative feedback? We
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don’t have answers by reading the news. Thus, this way of reporting is not persuasive
enough, as it doesn’t focus on detailed stories and lacks personalized images.
47 Second, in the phase of interpretation, hidden ideological considerations emerge through
intertextuality  analysis.  Chinese  newspapers  use  more  indirect  discourse  than direct
discourse  and  usually  put  the  essential  comments,  attitudes  and  judgments  inside
quotation  marks.  Besides,  semi-specified  sources,  which  only  give  the  ambiguous or
partial origin of the quotation, are high in the news reports.
 
Chinese official discourses analysis on BRI in Twitter
48 A total of 871 BRI-themed tweets are collected (see Table 2). As a national news agency,
Xinhua News Agency (@XHNews) released a total of 398 tweets. Since the BRI involves a
large number of the European countries, the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to
the European Union (@ChinaEUMission) has a high degree of publication (n=237) on this
topic during the observation period. 
 
Table 2. Statistics of BRI-themed tweets posted by Chinese state-owned media and embassies on
Twitter
Account @XHNews @ChinaEUMission @CGTNOfficial @ChinaMissionGva Total
Tweets 398 237 209 7 871
49 According to our observation, the frequency of Twitter publication is positively related to
China’s political dynamics on the Belt and Road Initiative. For instance, the most focused
tweets on the topic have emerged from the end of April to the end of May 2017. This
phase is the stage for China’s Belt and Road Forum in May 2017 in Beijing. As one of
China’s major home-country diplomatic activities in 2017, China’s media and embassies’
Twitter published information ceaselessly on the Belt and Road. In line with our statistics,
from April 16 to May 31, 2017, a total of 304 tweets were posted through five accounts,
and the volume of tweets in this month accounted for 34.3% of the total for the past two
years (see Figure 6). 
50 The release of these tweets follows at least three stages of dissemination: 1) the warm-up
phase of the Forum; 2) the concentrated release of news for showing up the advantages of
the BRI; 3) the concentrated presentation period of the forum results. Before the forum,
tweets issued by Beijing’s official channels are mainly focused on the background and the
introduction  of  the  Silk  Road.  China’s  official  communication  not  only  engages  in
highlighting  Beijing’s  economic  result  in  past  years  and  its  achievements  since  the
Reform in 1978, but it is also a concrete practice for China’s public diplomacy to build a
harmonious atmosphere for the forum. Second, the tweets during the forum are mainly
based on “Live Tweet” to report on China’s positions and other aspects of the Belt and
Road Initiative in real  time. Beijing tweets positive opinions pronounced by different
political and business leaders to endorse its geopolitical project. Third, after the forum,
the Twitter contents focus on the display of “forum results”. China’s state-owned media
post a series of tweets by explaining specific agreements reached between other countries
and China on the Belt and Road initiative.
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Figure 6. Frequency of Twitter publication of 5 monitored accounts
51 Besides,  the contents published by these accounts are not all  the same: Xinhua News
Agency posts tweets that involve all aspects of the news on the Belt and Road issues.
Aside from textual contents, it also published pictures, videos, links to external websites,
etc. The CGTN as China’s English language speaking TV station for foreign audiences,
releases  most  of  its  contents  on  audio  and  video  news,  as  well  as  interviews  with
international  politicians  and  scholars.  As  China’s  diplomatic  Twitter  account  for  the
European Union, the Chinese Embassy in the EU’s tweets mainly concern the bilateral and
multilateral relations between China and countries along the “Silk Road” in Europe. It
publishes as well as economic information to point out the benefits of the Chinese-EU
cooperation.
52 Moving on text mining,  after removing a series of  meaningless stop words,  by using
ConText,  high-frequency words in the corpus of  tweets are identified.  “China,” as the
original country of the Belt and Road Initiative is the most mentioned in the corpus. The
hashtag #Beltandroad is a famous label quoted by Chinese official Twitter. Simultaneously,
Chinese  President  Xi  Jinping also  has  relatively  high exposure  in these  tweets.  Also,
“global”,  “cooperation”,  and “development” seem to be  the keywords  in China’s  BRI
Twitter communication (see Figure 7).
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Figure 7. Corpus Statistic – Term Frequency
53 If more detailed attention is paid to the theme of these tweets, under the BRI framework,
the  Chinese  government  and  the  media  focus  on  promoting  a  series  of  topics,  like
“development”,  “cooperation”,  “initiative”,  “investment”,  “ties”,  “countries”,  “trade”,
“service”, “relations”, “opportunities”, “international”, “connectivity”, “world”, etc. (see
Figure 8).
 
Figure 8. Main topics of Tweet
54 These keywords show China’s “Major-Country” diplomacy defined by Chinese presidents
Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping as the “equality, mutual trust, inclusiveness, mutual learning
and  mutually  beneficial  cooperation”  (Hu,  2012)  that  can  “forge  a  new  form  of
international  relations  featuring  mutual  respect,  fairness,  justice,  and  win-win
cooperation” (Xi, 2017).
55 Besides, we use ConText to identify emotionally tagged words for sentiment analysis. This
process  permits  to  determine Chinese  media  and embassies’  subjective  attitudes  and
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emotions on the BRI Twitter communication. After the process of system tokenization
and  filtering  stop  words,  etc.,  256  terms  were  selected  and  analyzed.  According  to
sentiment analysis’s grid, 195 positive terms, 40 neutral terms and 21 negative ones have
been identified. 
56 As figure 9 highlights, Chinese media and embassies tend to use positive reporting and
positive orientation as the core of the BRI-themed communication on Twitter. In terms of
word choice, most words are positive or ambiguous and the government seldom uses
derogatory words. The terms most commonly found on Chinese official Twitter include
F0
B3( 10 times): cooperation (positive, 139); boost (positive, 22); great (positive, 21); benefit
(positive,  17);  support  (positive,  15);  central  (neutral,  15);  benefits  (positives,  14);
important (positive, 13); key (neutral, 11); open (positive, 11); relations (neutral, 10). 
57 Through the statistics and comparison of the above terms, we lay also points out that the
focus of the Belt and Road Twitter communication is mainly in the field of economic
cooperation.  The  word  “cooperation”  has  been  highly  promoted  by  the  Chinese
government with other positive terms, such as “boost”, “benefit” and “open”. It shows
that the main aspect in the communication process is the “mutually beneficial and win-
win cooperation” as the core idea of the BRI which serves the basic strategies of China’s
“major-country” diplomacy.
 
Figure 9. Frequency of sentiment analysis
58 By mobilizing quantitative data, we highlight China’s Twitter communication strategy on
the topic of BRI: China intends to build an image of openness, equality and inclusiveness
on its BRI efforts. By utilizing positive terms like “cooperation”, “boost”, “open”, China
intends to promote its proper globalization model to the world. 
59 The findings are similar between the Chinese press and media of the previous section and
the Twitter accounts. Words and topics highlighted are identical, whether it is effective
public diplomacy or an active framing policy supported by the central government.
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Discussion: the BRI, China’s solo dance in
international media communication
60 With only four years, analysis on the BRI as a hybrid competitive regionalism (such as the
BRICS) cannot be appropriately discussed, but similar trends, approaches and questions
emerge.  More  research  and  information  should  be  gathered  before  drawing  a  clear
picture of the topic. An article in the German newspaper Handelsblatt5 underlines the issue
raised  in  terms  of  unbalanced  trade,  topics  confirmed  during  an  interview  at  the
European Action external service in April 2018. Elements of analysis can be summarized
as a lack of reciprocity in the trade dispositions between EU and China.  Three other
documents related to trade, connectivity and a joint EU response to the BRI were released
in 2018 arguing on lack of mutual understanding6. 
 
Framing and narrative
61 To conclude on the framing and narrative results, we provide the following table 3.
 
Table 3. China strategic narratives (inspired from Schmitt, 2018, p. 10)
 System narrative Identity narrative
Main
narrative
US  anti-multilateralism  is
detrimental to a multipolar order.
China and Europe or the EU have a shared
history and myths that could be revivified.
Sub
narratives
Another  approach  to  development
than capitalism exists.
China has a great civilization to offer.
62 A large number of  scholars  have pointed out the close link between the Party-state,
Xinhua —the official news agency—and the discourses in the media of the country (Edney,
2012;  Li  & Chitty,  2009;  Yi  & Melissen,  2011).  In  such context,  we consider  that  the
arguments  elaborated  by  China’s  media  are  suffering  from one  bias:  the  framing  is
decided by the ruling party cannot be challenged by the media. In other words, dominant
statements guide the way media are authorized to reports official statements issued by
the government. It explains the similarities between mainstream media and social media
inside  and outside  the  country.  The analysis  of  Chinese  media  and Twitter  accounts
reveals  similar  findings  between  the  press  and  Twitter.  The  corpus  of  words  is
comparable—almost identical—as well as the tone, mostly positive focusing on a win-win
dimension between Europe and China. Criticism is seldom found.
63 Our  findings  in  the  European  press  are  reflecting  the  discourse  of  officials  through
Chinese  media  and  acknowledging  that  news  is  framed  according  to  the  central
government statement. Although large numbers of articles have not defined the content
of the BRI in a precise way, they have underlined the enormous dimensions of the project.
The BRI is sometimes seen as a form of hegemony since it raises rules and standards, and
the importance of finance and debts. 
64 The European press is mostly controversial and reflects a particular fear of China. The
categories elaborated after the analysis of articles indicate how the media contributes to
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the  framing of the  concept:  there  are  geopolitical,  strategic,  economic,  and political
issues. Although we cannot discuss the framing of each European newspaper, we argue
that the reference newspapers in each selected country are mostly balanced between
critical analysis and pro-liberal approach.
65 The European dimension and the questions on the implementation are also raised. We
have  also  noticed  some  economic  and  financial  arguments.  We  can  point  out  two
elements. There is one exception in our corpus: some authors, mostly consultants, and
some articles, primarily German ones (7 among 40), are underlying the benefits of the BRI
for  the  economic  and liberal  dimensions.  Interviews  with European civil  servants  in
charge of the BRI at DG MOVE (mobility and transports) provide more details.  While
discussing with their Chinese counterparts, they face difficulties in having more detailed
data and contents on the BRI. Moreover, on a similar register, there is much to say on the
proposals and solutions made by the European Commission regarding connectivity and
European Neighborhood Policy (Arifon, Huang, Zheng & Melo, 2019).
66 China relies on the myth of the Silk Road, seen as a way for trade and exchanges even if
the term was coined during the 19th century by a German geographer, Ferdinand von
Richthofen. It is both an identity and an issue narrative. On that, the European Council for
foreign relations argues: “under Xi Jinping, China focuses on its narratives rather than
showing convergence with global values” (Godement & Vasselier, 2017). On the identity
side, it excludes the USA from the story and focuses on issues such as connectivity and
trade, excluding social dimensions. And the positive motto of the Chinese government
completes the framing in a coherent manner (cooperation, win-win, voluntary basis…) as
our results reveal it.
 
It is a solo dance 
67 In conclusion, we argue that the communication of China regarding the BRI in the eyes of
European media is like a “solo dance”. It is a solo dance because media in the EU don’t
follow it (they don’t « dance » with China), and because the only voice comes from the
ruling party. The actual narrative appears as the following: “the globalization developed
under the Euro-American-dominated world and their rules are not successful. The BRI
will be a positive solution for all the partners involved.”
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NOTES
1. “Our  network  of  trusted  members  encompasses  more  than  220  of  the  best  investigative
reporters  from  83  countries  and  territories.  We  also  partner  with  more  than  100  media
organizations, from the world’s most renowned outlets, including the BBC, the New York Times, the
Guardian and  the  Asahi  Shimbun,  to  small  regional  nonprofit  investigative  centers.”  Source:
www.icij.org/about, consulted September 13th, 2018.
2. In  China,  the  Internet  implements  a  real-name  registration  system.  Most  social  media
platforms, such as Baidu and Weibo, require users to provide valid Chinese identity documents
and Chinese mobile phone numbers to authenticate users.
3. Interview with Shi Wei, April 19, 2018, Brussels.
4. The 16+1 format is an initiative by the People’s Republic of China aimed at intensifying and
expanding  cooperation  with  11  EU  Member  States  and  5  Balkan  countries  in  the  fields  of
investments,  transport,  finance,  science,  education,  and  culture.  In  the  framework  of  the
initiative,  China  has  defined  three  potential  priority  areas  for  economic  cooperation:
infrastructure, high technologies, and green technologies. Source: http://ceec-china-latvia.org/
page/about, consulted 11 July 2019.
5. EU ambassadors band together against Silk Road (https://global.handelsblatt.com/) April 17,
2018, consulted April 29, 2018.
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6. www.merics.org/en/blog/responding-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-two-steps-european-
strategy, consulted, September 12th, 2018. 
ABSTRACTS
This essay analyses both of Chinese and European discourses under the framework of Belt and
Road Initiative. It intends to compare different opinions in the context that rhetoric prevails
over  substance  and  a  political  project  over  economic  gain.  As  one  of  the  most  important
international  projects  designed  by  the  Chinese  president,  the  Belt  and  Road  Initiative  (BRI)
combines China’s ancient Silk Road history with Beijing’s contemporary “going out, going global”
strategy. It attempts to defend China multilateralism while projecting the Chinese dream. The
time frame of this research is from January 2016 to April 2018. We collected BRI-themed news
published in four tops European reference press and two Communist Party of China’s reference
organs by using media monitors (i.e.,Factiva, Europresse, TweetDeck). Combined with the Twitter
discourses analysis of Chinese media and diplomatic institutions in the same period and semi-
structured  interviews  with  Chinese-European  officials,  this  paper  analyzes  in  a  comparative
perspective the content of Chinese-European media framing and perceptions on BRI topics. 
Ce travail analyse les discours chinois et européen sur le projet de connectivité « Initiative route
et Ceinture » lorsqu’une rhétorique l’emporte sur un contenu et un projet politique sur des gains
économiques.  Désigné  par  le  président  chinois  comme  l’un  des  plus  importants  projets  de
coopération internationale, « l’initiative Route et ceinture », combine l’historique route de la soie
et la stratégie de « sortir du territoire » pour installer le multilatéralisme et promouvoir le rêve
chinois. La méthodologie utilise Factiva et Europresse pour recueillir la couverture média sur la
BRI  en  français,  anglais,  espagnol,  allemand  et  chinois.  Nous  étudions  quatre  journaux  de
référence européens entre  janvier  2016 et  avril  2018,  deux sources  chinoises  (China Daily  et
Global  Times),  ainsi  que  le  discours  sur  des  comptes  Twitter  des  autorités  chinoises.  Des
entretiens  semi-directifs  complètent  l’ensemble.  La  recherche  s’inscrit  dans  une  approche
comparée des perceptions européennes et chinoises sur la BRI. Une divergence de perceptions est
le facteur clé à prendre en compte.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Belt and road initiative, Chine, Europe, influence, discours, médias sociaux
Keywords: china, Belt and Road Initiative, European Media, Influence, Discourse
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